The first, Mehaffey v. Burger King involved a manager at Burger King who suffered a compensable knee injury while at work.  In the North Carolina Industrial Commission’s Opinion and Award, the Plaintiff was awarded retroactive attendant care fees for his wife, home modifications for a power wheel chair, a hospital bed, and transportation to doctors appointments.   Defendants argued that the Commission erred in awarding retroactive payments for attendant care because they were not pre-approved.  Shockingly, the Court agreed, even though the it recently held in the Boylan and Ruiz cases that pre-approval was not necessary for attendant care services.  The Court relied on the out-dated Hatchett case from 1954, which has been superceded by later Supreme Court decisions and legislative changes.  Perhaps the Court will agree to rehear the case, which appears to be a clear mistake.

Next, in Keeton v. Circle K, the Court affirmed the Industrial Commission’s Opinion and Award, which granted the defendants’ application to suspend benefits.  Keeton appealed the Commission’s decision, contending that she should be entitled to continuing benefits because she made a reasonable effort to return to work and there was no actual refusal to work.  The Court rejected these contentions, concluding there was sufficient evidence to show that the available manager position with Circle K fit within her physical restrictions, was “suitable employment,” and the Plaintiff made no effort to return to work at Circle K.  Thus, deeming the Plaintiff’s actions to be a voluntary refusal to accept suitable employment, the Court affirmed the denial of benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-32.

Introduction:

“The provision for extending the two-year time limitation for medical treatment is not often discussed, but it can make a profound difference for claimants who need medical care in the future. This paper discusses the development of this provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1, as well as the substantive and procedural issues raised by the statute.”

The Court agreed with the Commission with respect to Plaintiff’s lung cancer, lymph node cancer, and pleural plaquing.  However the Court reversed “the Commission’s determination that Argonaut was the responsible carrier as to plaintiff’s claim for asbestosis” and remanded to the Commission to determine which carrier was holding the risk during the time Plaintiff was last exposed to asbestos for “30 working days, or parts thereof, within seven consecutive calendar months” and thus responsible for Plaintiff’s asbestosis with respect to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57.  The Court also sent back to the Commission for further findings of fact the issues of the apportionment of the award for Plaintiff’s lung damage, the carrier responsible for Plaintiff’s laryngeal cancer, and the determination of Plaintiff’s average weekly wage.  This case is difficult because when determining which carrier was covering the risk for the Plaintiff’s occupational disease, the Commission must rely on work records and expense reports from years ago that were not always accurate while still meeting the requirements of  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57.

The first, Salomon v. The Oaks of Carolina, involved a Certified Nurse’s Assistant (CNA) whose shoulder was injured when she was changing a partially paralyzed patient by herself with one arm and holding him up with the other.  The resident pushed back suddenly and the plaintiff heard a crack and had pain in her shoulder.  The defendants argued that the injury was not caused by accident because on the weekends the facility is often short staffed so it not uncommon for only one CNA to lift or move a resident.  The Court rejected defendants’ argument, holding that the unexpected event in this case was the sudden push back by the resident who does not typically resist assistance.  The injury therefore is by accident, and thus compensable. Regarding disability, the Court remanded the case to the Industrial Commission to make more detailed findings of fact.

The Second case, Thompson v. FedEx Ground/RPS, Inc., involved a woman who injured her back in 2000 when lifting luggage out of her rental car on a business trip.  Plaintiff appealed the Opinion and Award by the Industrial Commission, contending that the Commission failed to hold that there is a presumption of disability because of a prior award of disability from the Commission.  The Court, however, held that because the prior award only addressed the back injury and not the plaintiff’s alleged mysofascial pain syndrome and fibromyalgia, there was no presumption of disability and thus benefits would not be paid for the plaintiff’s other ailments.  The Court also upheld the Commission’s finding that the plaintiff’s alleged mysofascial pain syndrome and fibromyalgia were not related to her back injury.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in another recent workers’ compensation case, Campos-Brizvela v. Rocha Masonry LLC, affirmed the Industrial Commission’s decision granting medical and disability benefits to a man whose hand were nearly amputated while cleaning a concrete pump.  Defendants appealed, arguing that because the plaintiff was hired by an employee of Rocha Masonry “who lacked the authority to make such a decision,” he was not employed for purposes of worker’s compensation at the time of his injury.  The Court found that a foreman for the defendant hired the plaintiff to work at a job site, drove the plaintiff to the job, told him that he would be earning $9.00 an hour paid by means of a check drawn on the account the employer, and directed the activities of the plaintiff and of others while at the job site.  Based on these facts, the Court correctly stated that because “Plaintiff reasonably believed he had been hired by someone with the authority to do so” he was considered an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation.  This is consistent with the basic agency principle of apparent authority.  Thus, the definition of an “employee” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2) does not require employees to determine whether or not the person who hired them was “acting within the scope of [their] actual authority.”  The Court also upheld the finding that the plaintiff was disabled.

Ms. Campbell suffered injuries to her right hand and fingers when attempting to stop her fall by grabbing a nearby pipe.  This injury and resulting disability also aggravated Ms. Campbell’s depression, which had been manageable up to this point.  In the appeal, the defendants contended that the Commission erred in assigning weight to Dr. Williams’ testimony, arguing that they considered it to be speculative because he did not identify a specific degree to which Ms. Campbell’s compensable injury by accident had exacerbated her preexisting condition.   However, the Court held that Dr. Williams did not need to determine to what degree the workplace injury exacerbated the psychological condition, but only that it was a factor in the exacerbation of Ms. Cambell’s preexisting condition.  The defendants also contended that the Commission did not determine if plaintiff’s statements to her doctor were credible, but the Court ruled that a doctor is entitled to rely on information provided by the patient to form his opinion.  And, in any event, the Court of Appeals does not have authority to reweigh evidence or credibility determinations after the Commission has considered it.  Defendants’ final argument that the Commission erred in giving weight to Dr. Prakken’s opinion was overruled by the Court, which concluded that the Commission does not need to explain why it has given weight to particular evidence.

The Supreme Court, in a short per curiam order, concluded that the Industrial Commission failed to make findings on one of the key factual issues: whether the cement area where plaintiff fell was part of defendant-employer’s premises or part of the parking lot.  Accordingly, the Court remanded the case back to the Commission for additional fact-finding.

Burton Craige assisted with the amicus brief filed by the North Carolina Advocates of Justice in this case.