The Supreme Court has granted review on these issues:

“(1) Whether deference is owed to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s outside sales exemption and related regulations; and (2) whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s outside sales exemption applies to pharmaceutical sales representatives.”

The petition for certiorari may be viewed here.

 Introduction:  The 2010 Term of the Supreme Court of the United States put a spotlight on the significant – though oddly unheralded – role that employment law plays in our country’s economy and in our citizens’ daily lives. One of the nation’s keenest (and self-described “obsessive”) Court observers recently characterized this term as “straight-up dull.” Emily Bazelon, “Chamber of Pain,” The New York Times Magazine, p. 9 (August 7, 2011.) My own judgment, however, is that what the Justices did in the employment area was consequential, if not downright exciting.  Through a number of employment-related cases, a cohesive and assertive majority of the Court fashioned the law to fit its socio-economic (if not overtly political) view that the employment relationship ought to be deregulated.  In doing so, the Court continued to pursue what the Reagan revolution began and the Tea Party followers hope to complete.  But more about that later.  For Court observers of all political stripes, the 2010 Term’s smorgasbord of decisions provides a feast to be savored and debated for months to come.

The plaintiff, an employee at Saint-Gobain, complained verbally several times about the placement of the time clock at Saint-Gobain being unlawful.  The time clock was placed beyond the area where workers were required to dress in protective clothing thus they were not paid for the time they donned and doffed their protective work gear.  A lower court ruled in a related case that the placement of the time clock was indeed a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  In this case, the Court considered the use of the phrase “filed any complaint” and whether it allowed for a complaint about a violation to be filed orally or if it strictly limited complaints to be filed in writing.  Justice Breyer thoroughly defined the word “file” and “filed” only to conclude that what really mattered was the spirit of the text.  Breyer found that the intended purpose of the FLSA was to protect employees many of which, at the time the law was written, were illiterate and incapable of filing complaints in writing.  The Court concluded that employees may file complaints orally if the complaint is “sufficiently clear and detailed [enough] for a reasonable employer to understand it.”  The Court, however, did not address an equally important issue about whether a complaint must be filed with a government agency, not simply an employer, to fall within the standards of the FLSA anti-retaliation provision.

This case is a partial win for employees, granting them further protection against employment discrimination under the FLSA.  (More coverage here.)

UPDATE: Jonathan Harkavy’s commentary on this case can be found here from his overview of the Supreme Court’s employment law decisions during their 2010 session.

Because the language of USERRA is very similar to Title VII, this principal likely also applies to cases of race and sex discrimination at least.  (More coverage here, here.)

Introduction: The 2009 Term of the Supreme Court of the United States illustrated in unmistakable fashion the central role that workplace regulation plays in the lives of our citizens. The Court’s determination of a broad range of employment-related issues maintained its focus on employment law that began several terms ago. Not only do this term’s decisions affect a variety of policies and rules applicable to workers, employers and benefit providers, but the Roberts Court’s unabashed interest in doctrinal development, revealed by a deeper look at its decisions, also is reshaping the employment relationship itself and altering how work-related disputes are to be resolved. 

For the first term in nearly a decade, the Court appears to be emerging from the shadow of the September 11, 2001 attack on our nation. To be sure, judicial fallout from the consequences of that assault, including construction of the Patriot Act and the Military Commissions Act and application of habeas corpus, is still noticeable, particularly in detainee disputes, but these cases no longer dominate center stage on the Court’s docket or capture headlines as they did in many of the past several terms. As a consequence, the Court has shown a renewed interest in doctrinal change generally, with a focus on employment law in particular. Most notably, this turn of events coincides with the coalescence of a reformist majority led by Chief Justice Roberts. As Adam Liptak’s recent review of the Roberts’ Court’s first five years points out, Justice Alito’s succession to Justice O’Connor’s seat has moved the Court rightward philosophically, making it (in Liptak’s words) the “most conservative” Court in recent history. The New York Times, July 25, 2010, pp. 1, 20-23. This term’s employment decisions do not contradict Liptak’s assessment. In sum, the spotlight on the employment relationship during the 2009 Term was manifest not only in the employment and labor cases themselves, but also in a variety of non-employment decisions that are likely to have a bearing on workers and employers alike. For employment lawyers, therefore, the 2009 Term was a revealing and consequential one, to say the least.

In the first, Granite Rock v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Court ruled for the company, as ScotusBlog describes:

The parties had reached a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), but they disagreed about both when the CBA was formed and who should decide that question.  Today the Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that a court, rather than an arbitrator, should decide when the CBA was formed.  The Court explained that under the CBA, arbitration is required only when a dispute “arise[s] under” the agreement – which a dispute over when the CBA was formed does not.  The Court also held that the lower court properly declined to recognize a new federal common-law cause of action against the parent international union, which – according to the employer – tortiously interfered with the CBA.

In the second, Rent-a-Center v. Jackson, the Court sided with the employer, and held that the issue of unconscionability (a challenge to whether the arbitration agreement is valid in the first place), was to be decided by the arbitrator, as Workplace Prof Blog describes:

The Court held the issue was governed by the separability doctrine of Prima Paint: an arbitration agreement is assailable only if the arbitration agreement itself — not the overall agreement of which the arbitration is a part — is assailable on state-contract law grounds.  So far, so good for Jackson — until today, this separability doctrine has been applied only when an arbitration agreement was part of a broader (“container”) agreement that was not related to arbitration — e.g., an arbitration provision in a consulting-services contract or in a larger employment contract.  Jackson’s unconscionability argument was directed squarely at his arbitration agreement.

Today, however, the Court extended Prima Paint to hold that the arbitration agreement itself can be the container contract, and that unconscionability arguments must be directed toward specific provisions of the arbitration agreement.  Jackson’s unconscionability arguments, the Court held, were directed at the arbitration agreement generally, and therefore could not be grounds for voiding the arbitration agreement as a whole.

Read the whole post for its insightful analysis of how the Court erred, once again stretching the law to give a victory to employers over employees.

In the second case, New Process Steel v. NLRB, the Court resolved the circuit split regarding whether the National Labor Relations Board could lawfully act with a two-member quorum because the three vacancies on the board had gone unfilled for so long.  A 5-4 majority (Stevens surprisingly joining 4 conservatives) rejected the Board’s argument, and held that the NLRA required 3 members to act.  The hundreds of decisions issued by the two-member board will probably have to be re-reviewed, though one hopes this could be expedited now that two of the vacancies have been filled by President Obama.  Board decisions can take a long time even extra without this delay, often to the detriment of workers and unions seeking to organize and bargain.  More analysis is here and here.

The second case, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., concerns when plaintiffs in ERISA actions can receive attorneys’ fees for succeeding in their case.  ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) is the statue that governs employee benefits plans.  In this case, the plaintiff challenged the insurance company’s denial of her long-term disability benefits, and after a court found she would likely prevail, the insurance company awarded her the benefits.

In a nearly unanimous opinion (Thomas writing) reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court held that a party who seeks to recover attorney’s fees in an ERISA case does not need to be a “prevailing party.”  Instead, a court may award fees and costs under the statute if the claimant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits.”  Thus, the trial court here was correct in awarding the plaintiff attorneys’ fees for basically succeeding in obtaining her benefits.  More coverage here and here.

In Conkirght v. Frommert, the 5-3 majority upheld the company’s denial of pension benefits to former employees.  Write-up here.

In Perdue v. Kenny A., the 5-4 majority rejected the trial court’s calculations of the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees for the prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights case.  Write-up here.

In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, a similar 5-3 majority rejected class action arbitration in this commercial case.  Down the line, there might be some applicability to employer-employee arbitration agreements.  Write-up here.