The Court held that, because plaintiff’s CSRA claim was based on her EEO charge, the district court’s dismissal of the CSRA claim was improper.  The Court also held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against plaintiff on her WPA claim as she created genuine issues of material fact regarding whether her whistle-blowing was properly reported and known by the supervisor who terminated her.  However, the Court held that the district court was correct to grant summary judgment against plaintiff on her Title VII claims because plaintiff was not whistle-blowing about an employment practice, which is necessary for a Title VII retaliation claim.

In Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s Title VII claims on the pleadings.  Applying the misguided heightened pleading standard recently created by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit held the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege discrimination because he did not establish a plausible basis for believing white co-employees were similarly situated to him or that race was the true basis for his termination.  The Court also upheld the dismissal of his FMLA claims, holding that under the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has not properly allowed FMLA claims against a State where the FMLA claim is based on the need for leave for one’s own medical condition.

The second case, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., concerns when plaintiffs in ERISA actions can receive attorneys’ fees for succeeding in their case.  ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) is the statue that governs employee benefits plans.  In this case, the plaintiff challenged the insurance company’s denial of her long-term disability benefits, and after a court found she would likely prevail, the insurance company awarded her the benefits.

In a nearly unanimous opinion (Thomas writing) reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court held that a party who seeks to recover attorney’s fees in an ERISA case does not need to be a “prevailing party.”  Instead, a court may award fees and costs under the statute if the claimant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits.”  Thus, the trial court here was correct in awarding the plaintiff attorneys’ fees for basically succeeding in obtaining her benefits.  More coverage here and here.