Introduction:

“The provision for extending the two-year time limitation for medical treatment is not often discussed, but it can make a profound difference for claimants who need medical care in the future. This paper discusses the development of this provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1, as well as the substantive and procedural issues raised by the statute.”

This is a summary of the Union’s argument:  Because national labor policy strongly favors arbitration as the means for resolving labor disputes, courts must apply a presumption of arbitrability to collective bargaining agreements that contain arbitration provisions, and direct the parties to arbitrate unless the parties have expressly agreed not to arbitrate a particular matter.  Any doubt or ambiguity regarding arbitrability is to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 

Here, the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and separate settlement agreement for grievant Brian Pollard require arbitration of the grievance regarding Pollard’s termination because Pollard was not a “new employee” when he was rehired in 2010.  Moreover, to the extent the settlement agreement is ambiguous about permitting Pollard’s grievance to be arbitrated, that ambiguity must be construed in favor of arbitration.  Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied, and plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration – filed this same day – should be granted.

Here is a summary of the Union’s position: 

First, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for failure to timely effect service because plaintiff did not properly serve defendant before the 120-day deadline elapsed, and had no good cause for its failure to do so.  Second, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because plaintiff CFPTA was not a party to the arbitration decision that it seeks to vacate, has no standing to challenge the decision, and has provided no relevant authority to demonstrate that it is permitted to bring this suit under 28 U.S.C. § 185. 

Third, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for failure to state a valid claim to vacate the arbitration decision.  The arbitrator correctly determined that Professional Transit Management of Wilmington, Inc. (“PTM”) violated the controlling collective bargain agreement (“CBA”) in terminating the grievant, and to the extent there was ambiguity in the operative language of the CBA, the arbitrator’s interpretation cannot be disturbed by the Court.  Under the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court, plaintiff has also failed to show how the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate the grievant violates any clearly established public policy.  For all these reasons, the Court should award defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this litigation because plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award has no arguable basis in the law.

In April 1993, Mr. Taylor was wrongfully convicted and sentenced to life in prison for a murder two years earlier which he did not commit.  The Defendants worked in the SBI Crime Lab and wrote a deliberately misleading report about evidence collected from the crime scene.  Because this report misrepresented the facts and the findings of the laboratory tests, Mr. Taylor was convicted of a crime he did not commit and spent the next 17 years in prison.  On February 17, 2011 a three-judge panel unanimously found that Mr. Taylor was innocent of the charge of murder and ordered his immediate release.  Mr. Taylor was given a full Pardon of Innocence by Governor Beverly Perdue on May 21, 2010.

Mr. Taylor’s complaint brings claims under the federal constitution, North Carolina Constitution, and North Carolina common law.  Mr. Taylor is represented by Burton Craige and Narendra Ghosh, as well as Spencer Parris and Christopher Olson at Martin & Jones.

Ms. Campbell suffered injuries to her right hand and fingers when attempting to stop her fall by grabbing a nearby pipe.  This injury and resulting disability also aggravated Ms. Campbell’s depression, which had been manageable up to this point.  In the appeal, the defendants contended that the Commission erred in assigning weight to Dr. Williams’ testimony, arguing that they considered it to be speculative because he did not identify a specific degree to which Ms. Campbell’s compensable injury by accident had exacerbated her preexisting condition.   However, the Court held that Dr. Williams did not need to determine to what degree the workplace injury exacerbated the psychological condition, but only that it was a factor in the exacerbation of Ms. Cambell’s preexisting condition.  The defendants also contended that the Commission did not determine if plaintiff’s statements to her doctor were credible, but the Court ruled that a doctor is entitled to rely on information provided by the patient to form his opinion.  And, in any event, the Court of Appeals does not have authority to reweigh evidence or credibility determinations after the Commission has considered it.  Defendants’ final argument that the Commission erred in giving weight to Dr. Prakken’s opinion was overruled by the Court, which concluded that the Commission does not need to explain why it has given weight to particular evidence.

Dail has properly stated cognizable claims for relief arising from his wrongful incarceration. Dail has stated a valid claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), because Defendants had a policy or practice of failing to properly inventory and safeguard evidence, including the evidence that ultimately exonerated Dail. Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct arbitrarily denied Dail’s liberty interest and resulted in his continued wrongful incarceration. Unlike the plaintiff in District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009), the principal case upon which Defendants rely, Dail has not impermissibly used § 1983 to seek access to potential evidence, but instead properly invokes § 1983 to redress Defendants’ unconstitutional failure to reasonably maintain evidence.

Dail has also properly brought state law claims for negligence and obstruction of justice, which are not time-barred. Those claims did not accrue until August 27, 2007, when Defendants first notified Dail of the results of the DNA testing, or on August 28, 2007, when Dail was finally released from custody, and thus were timely filed on August 26, 2010. Finally, Dail has stated valid claims under the North Carolina Constitution based on Defendants’ violations of his rights to procedural due process and entitlement to exculpatory evidence.

This case presents weighty issues of constitutional significance in an evolving area of law. Consideration of the merits of the claims asserted in this action should follow development of a full factual record.

More from the opinion below:

The primary question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in holding that the contents of a particular letter from defense counsel to counsel for the plaintiffs, as clarified by a follow-up letter from defense counsel thirteen days later, rendered moot the plaintiffs’ claims for unpaid overtime wages in a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, such that a live case or controversy no longer existed with respect to such claims, requiring their dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We answer this question in the affirmative, and therefore, vacate the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In sum, the fact that the Defendants’ offer to settle the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims (as contained in the letter dated May 16, 2008, and as clarified by the follow-up letter thirteen days later) did not offer for judgment to be entered against the Defendants, was ambiguous as to the amounts of actual and liquidated damages to be recovered, and was conditioned upon an agreement by the Plaintiffs to keep the settlement confidential, prevented the mooting of the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims. Accordingly, we hold the district court erred by dismissing the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the district court’s order dismissing such claims and corresponding judgment, and remand such portion of this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also vacate the district court’s order denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional collective action certification of their FLSA claims and their amended version of such motion, because the district court denied these motions upon its erroneous belief that the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims had already been rendered moot. On remand, we direct the district court to reconsider these motions in light of our holding that the May 16, 2008 letter, as clarified by the May 29, 2008 letter, did not render the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims moot.

Mr. Sprinkle was working for his employer Blythe Industries as a tack distributor truck driver on December 3, 2008, the day of his injury.  That morning his truck was empty and he drove to Hammaker East to have the truck loaded with tack.  After directing him to the loading dock and inserting the pipe into his truck, a Hammaker employee told Mr. Sprinkle that the pipes were clogged and it would be a little while before the tack started flowing.  Mr. Sprinkle remained on top of his truck, as he normally did, waiting for the tack to flow.  What he did not know, because Hammaker employees failed to tell him, was that, when the clog loosened, it would come out with a big “kapow.”  He also did not know that, in addition to blowing air through, and heating the pipes, the Hammaker employees left on the valve that allowed tack to flow from their system into Mr. Sprinkle’s truck.  When the clog finally loosened, the pipe came bursting out of the truck, spraying tack all over the truck and Mr. Sprinkle and knocking Mr. Sprinkle more than 10 feet to the ground.

Mr. Sprinkle’s knee was “pulverized” according to his doctor.  He had a complicated surgery to reconstruct his knee, a long period of recovery, and will likely need knee replacement surgery in the future.  After knocking him off his truck, Hammaker employees left Mr. Sprinkle sitting outside in the below-freezing temperature, until his supervisor arrived and called 911.  There was testimony that Hammaker’s plant manager, Bryan Miller, was slurring his words and reeked of alcohol immediately after Mr. Sprinkle’s fall.

Attorneys Valerie Johnson and Narendra Ghosh and paralegal Elizabeth Weatherspoon provided valuable assistance throughout the trial.