And, in other interesting EEOC news, the EEOC recently brought a lawsuit against Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, accusing it of discriminating against black job applicants through the way it uses credit histories in its hiring process.  The EEOC alleges that Kaplan’s rejection of job applicants based on their credit history has “disparate impact” on black applicants.

Under Title II of GINA, it is illegal to discriminate against employees or applicants because of genetic information. Title II of GINA prohibits the use of genetic information in making employment decisions, restricts employers and other entities from requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information, and strictly limits the disclosure of genetic information.  More details on GINA can be found at the EEOC.

The main dispute in this case centers on whether Kessel’s conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. To be actionable, sexual harassment must be objectively hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively perceive it as such.

If this case were merely about the crude or vulgar commentary which is an unfortunate feature of some workplaces, then Fairbrook would be correct to assert that the EEOC has no claim. Title VII, after all, is not “a general civility code.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. “[W]hile no one condones boorishness, there is a line between what can justifiably be called sexual harassment and what is merely crude behavior.” Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2008). Activities like simple teasing, offhand comments, and off-color jokes, while often regrettable, do not cross the line into actionable misconduct.

This case involves more than general crudity, however. Waechter’s allegations, if proven, show that Kessel targeted her with highly personalized comments designed to demean and humiliate her. In some cases, the remarks seemed intended to ridicule her in the eyes of patients and drug representatives. We have previously recognized that there is a difference between “generalized” statements that pollute the work environment and “personal gender-based remarks” that single out individuals for ridicule. See Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 197 (4th Cir. 2000). Common experience teaches that the latter have a greater impact on their listeners and thus are more severe forms of harassment.

The fact that this interaction took place at a medical clinic need not negate its severity, as Fairbrook contends. It is true that employees at Fairbrook had clinical duties which are not part of other professions, and it is likewise accurate that some employees, including Waechter, occasionally made off-color remarks. But a plaintiff’s claim is not defeated solely because she engages in some crude behavior.

Moreover, we decline to accept the argument that a medical setting, because it deals with human anatomy, is somehow liberated from professional norms. This argument is essentially an effort to exempt medical settings from the requirements of Title VII, notwithstanding the fact that Congress did not do so.

Second, Fairbook argues that Kessel’s conduct was not sufficiently severe because it did not cause Waechter to miss work due to stress or otherwise adversely affect her job performance. These factors, while relevant, are not decisive here. “Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. The fact that a plaintiff continued to work under difficult conditions is to her credit, not the harasser’s. Moreover, the fact that Waechter continued to provide quality care to her patients in spite of Kessel’s conduct is not dispositive either.

For the reasons above, we conclude that the EEOC has produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Kessel’s conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. This evidence, if proven at trial, indicates that Kessel, who was both Waechter’s supervisor and the sole owner of the establishment, crossed the line from general crudity into actionable harassment by subjecting Waechter to a series of sexually graphic and unmistakably personal remarks that made her work environment intensely uncomfortable.

While Congress did well in enacting GINA, its effort to extend unemployment benefits was apparently poorly executed.  Although Congress lengthened the period for extended benefits, it failed to renew the extended benefit program beyond the end of the year.  Hopefully Congress will act quickly, because North Carolina’s unemployment rate is now 11%, but the Senate has been anything but speedy as of late.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal agency tasked with issuing regulations that provide more specific rules concering the act.  According to a Notice by the EEOC about the ADAAA, the Act retains the ADA’s basic definition of “disability” as an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. However, it changes the way that these statutory terms should be interpreted in several ways. Most significantly, the Act:

• directs EEOC to revise that portion of its regulations defining the term “substantially limits”;
• expands the definition of “major life activities” by including two non-exhaustive lists;
• states that mitigating measures other than “ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses” shall not be considered in assessing whether an individual has a disability;
• clarifies that an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active;
• changes the definition of “regarded as” so that it no longer requires a showing that the employer perceived the individual to be substantially limited in a major life activity, and instead says that an applicant or employee is “regarded as” disabled if he or she is subject to an action prohibited by the ADA (e.g., failure to hire or termination) based on an impairment that is not transitory and minor; and
• provides that individuals covered only under the “regarded as” prong are not entitled to reasonable accommodation.

On September 16, the EEOC approved its proposed regulations to implement the ADAAA.  The EEOC has a questions and answers page that goes into some detail about the ADAAA changes to the law.    There is a 60-day period in which the public may submit comments to EEOC about the proposed regulation. At the end of this period, EEOC will evaluate all of the comments and make revisions in response to those comments.