More from the opinion below:

The primary question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in holding that the contents of a particular letter from defense counsel to counsel for the plaintiffs, as clarified by a follow-up letter from defense counsel thirteen days later, rendered moot the plaintiffs’ claims for unpaid overtime wages in a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, such that a live case or controversy no longer existed with respect to such claims, requiring their dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We answer this question in the affirmative, and therefore, vacate the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In sum, the fact that the Defendants’ offer to settle the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims (as contained in the letter dated May 16, 2008, and as clarified by the follow-up letter thirteen days later) did not offer for judgment to be entered against the Defendants, was ambiguous as to the amounts of actual and liquidated damages to be recovered, and was conditioned upon an agreement by the Plaintiffs to keep the settlement confidential, prevented the mooting of the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims. Accordingly, we hold the district court erred by dismissing the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the district court’s order dismissing such claims and corresponding judgment, and remand such portion of this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also vacate the district court’s order denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional collective action certification of their FLSA claims and their amended version of such motion, because the district court denied these motions upon its erroneous belief that the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims had already been rendered moot. On remand, we direct the district court to reconsider these motions in light of our holding that the May 16, 2008 letter, as clarified by the May 29, 2008 letter, did not render the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims moot.

The second case, Shupe v. City of Charlotte, concerned a police officer who injured her knee during her employment.  Her knee did not recover, and it was eventually determined that she arthroscopic surgery.  Charlotte opposed the surgery, which required the plaintiff to get an order from the Industrial Commission ordering the surgery.  Unfortunately, by the time this order was obtained, plaintiff was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer.  Her oncologist concluded that she could not have knee surgery because it would interfere with her cancer treatment.  Without the knee surgery, plaintiff could not return to work.  The Court affirmed the Industrial Commission’s award of temporary total disability benefits to plaintiff because her inability to work was caused by a combination of the compensable right knee injury, her subsequent inability to obtain corrective surgery because of her cancer, and the effects of her cancer treatments.  “Our courts have held that where a claimant is rendered totally unable to earn wages, partially as a result of a compensable injury and partially as a result of a non-work-related medical condition, the claimant is entitled to an award for total disability under G.S. § 97-29.”  The Court also would not let Charlotte escape liability by creating a temporary light-duty position for the plaintiff.  Because this position was a make-work temporary position, and not ordinarily available, it does not constitute suitable employment for the plaintiff to return to.

Here is the summary of our argument: 

As the Industrial Commission concluded, plaintiff Cheri Evans is entitled to compensation for an injury by accident that occurred on April 19, 2005, during a four-day business trip in Charlotte.  Plaintiff was seriously injured after she drank  alcohol provided by the defendant-employer and then left the  raucous business dinner to return to her hotel.  The risk of injury was increased due to the nature of the work dinner, and her injury had its origins in that risk.  Moreover, this Court has conclusively established that an employee on a business trip who is injured while returning to her hotel must be compensated under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Thus, plaintiff’s injury, a rational consequence of the circumstances of her employment, is compensable.

Defendants’ contention that plaintiff loses her right to compensation because she engaged in negligent or “thrill-seeking” behavior should be rejected for two reasons.  First, this Court had held that an employee’s injury remains compensable even if it is caused by the employee’s own negligence or foolish activity.  Second, it was plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol provided by her employer that led to her loss of inhibition and contributed to her accident.  Therefore, plaintiff’s injury by accident was causally related to her employment because it was contributed to by defendant-employer’s provision of alcohol at an employer-sponsored dinner.

Plaintiff is thus entitled to total and partial wage loss compensation, among other benefits, as awarded by the Commission.  Defendants cannot meet their burden of proving plaintiff constructively refused suitable employment by being terminated because the undisputed facts on appeal demonstrate that (1) plaintiff’s termination was related to her compensable injury; and (2) a non-disabled employee would not have been terminated for the same reasons she was terminated.  In addition, the uncontested factual findings establish that plaintiff is disabled under the Act, and thus entitled to benefits, because her new employment – suitable to her qualifications and injury-related physical limitations – has reduced her wages.  Not only are the relevant facts unchallenged on appeal, but are also amply supported by competent evidence in the record.  Accordingly, the Commission’s Opinion and Award should be affirmed in full.