Introduction:

“The provision for extending the two-year time limitation for medical treatment is not often discussed, but it can make a profound difference for claimants who need medical care in the future. This paper discusses the development of this provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1, as well as the substantive and procedural issues raised by the statute.”

 Introduction:  The 2010 Term of the Supreme Court of the United States put a spotlight on the significant – though oddly unheralded – role that employment law plays in our country’s economy and in our citizens’ daily lives. One of the nation’s keenest (and self-described “obsessive”) Court observers recently characterized this term as “straight-up dull.” Emily Bazelon, “Chamber of Pain,” The New York Times Magazine, p. 9 (August 7, 2011.) My own judgment, however, is that what the Justices did in the employment area was consequential, if not downright exciting.  Through a number of employment-related cases, a cohesive and assertive majority of the Court fashioned the law to fit its socio-economic (if not overtly political) view that the employment relationship ought to be deregulated.  In doing so, the Court continued to pursue what the Reagan revolution began and the Tea Party followers hope to complete.  But more about that later.  For Court observers of all political stripes, the 2010 Term’s smorgasbord of decisions provides a feast to be savored and debated for months to come.

Introduction:

On July 25, 2011, the North Carolina House of Representatives, by a vote of 74-42, overrode Governor Perdue’s veto of the medical malpractice bill (SB 33). The enactment of SB 33 culminated an intense six-month legislative battle.

When the Act becomes effective on October 1, 2011, a new era of malpractice litigation in North Carolina will begin. Injured patients, who already face formidable barriers, will find it harder to find a lawyer, pursue their claims, and recover adequate compensatory damages. Lawyers and judges will be forced to decipher complex new statutory language.  Courts will confront constitutional challenges to the bill’s most controversial provision, the $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages.

Introduction:

In June 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted HB 542, titled “Tort Reform for Citizens and Businesses.”  Section 1.1 of HB 542 creates a new rule of evidence (Rule 414) that limits evidence of past medical expenses to “the amounts actually paid to satisfy the bills” and “the amounts actually necessary to satisfy the bills that have been incurred but not yet satisfied.”  Section 1.2 amends G.S. § 8-58.1, limiting the plaintiff’s testimony about reasonable medical expenses to the amount “paid or required to be paid in full satisfaction” of the charges. In combination, the new provisions, commonly referred to as “billed v. paid,” will significantly reduce the amount that injured plaintiffs can recover for their medical expenses.  The billed v. paid provisions are effective for all actions “arising on or after” October 1, 2011.

In the past decade, many states have confronted the billed v. paid issue in their appellate courts.  A handful of states have addressed the issue legislatively.  This paper reviews the experience in other jurisdictions, traces the evolution of billed v. paid in North Carolina, and identifies a potential constitutional challenge to the new legislation.

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Introduction: The 2009 Term of the Supreme Court of the United States illustrated in unmistakable fashion the central role that workplace regulation plays in the lives of our citizens. The Court’s determination of a broad range of employment-related issues maintained its focus on employment law that began several terms ago. Not only do this term’s decisions affect a variety of policies and rules applicable to workers, employers and benefit providers, but the Roberts Court’s unabashed interest in doctrinal development, revealed by a deeper look at its decisions, also is reshaping the employment relationship itself and altering how work-related disputes are to be resolved. 

For the first term in nearly a decade, the Court appears to be emerging from the shadow of the September 11, 2001 attack on our nation. To be sure, judicial fallout from the consequences of that assault, including construction of the Patriot Act and the Military Commissions Act and application of habeas corpus, is still noticeable, particularly in detainee disputes, but these cases no longer dominate center stage on the Court’s docket or capture headlines as they did in many of the past several terms. As a consequence, the Court has shown a renewed interest in doctrinal change generally, with a focus on employment law in particular. Most notably, this turn of events coincides with the coalescence of a reformist majority led by Chief Justice Roberts. As Adam Liptak’s recent review of the Roberts’ Court’s first five years points out, Justice Alito’s succession to Justice O’Connor’s seat has moved the Court rightward philosophically, making it (in Liptak’s words) the “most conservative” Court in recent history. The New York Times, July 25, 2010, pp. 1, 20-23. This term’s employment decisions do not contradict Liptak’s assessment. In sum, the spotlight on the employment relationship during the 2009 Term was manifest not only in the employment and labor cases themselves, but also in a variety of non-employment decisions that are likely to have a bearing on workers and employers alike. For employment lawyers, therefore, the 2009 Term was a revealing and consequential one, to say the least.

Leto will be speaking about employment law issues that workers’ compensation practitioners should be aware of, such as the ADA and FMLA.  Wage and hour issues are also important ones to consider.  As this short paper prepared by Leto and Narendra Ghosh states, “Workers’ compensation practitioners should remain vigilant for potential wage and hour violations as they pursue claims for their clients. When getting information on a client’s average weekly wage, for instance, it is important to at least consider whether your client is getting paid fully, including for overtime, under the wage and hour laws.”

Summary:  North Carolina is one of only five jurisdictions that retain the antiquated doctrine of contributory negligence. Here, as in Alabama, Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia, a plaintiff whose negligence makes the slightest contribution to his injury is barred from recovering any damages against the tortfeasor. The other 46 states, either by judicial decision or by statute, have adopted some form of comparative fault, allocating damages based on the degree of fault among the plaintiff and the defendants.

In May 2009, the North Carolina House of Representatives passed a bill that would abolish contributory negligence, adopt a system of modified comparative fault, and modify joint and several liability.  Modeled on the Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act (UATRA), the bill attracted bipartisan sponsorship and support.  After the sponsors agreed to several last-minute amendments that favored defendants, the bill (HB 813) passed by a margin of 67-50, overcoming strong opposition from business and insurance interests.

In the 2010 session, the North Carolina Senate will consider HB 813.  If the bill passes the Senate, it will end the long, harsh regime of contributory negligence, and bring North Carolina tort law into the modern era.  This article discusses the provisions of UATRA, the amendments adopted in the House, and the principal objections to the bill.