Mr. Sprinkle was working for his employer Blythe Industries as a tack distributor truck driver on December 3, 2008, the day of his injury.  That morning his truck was empty and he drove to Hammaker East to have the truck loaded with tack.  After directing him to the loading dock and inserting the pipe into his truck, a Hammaker employee told Mr. Sprinkle that the pipes were clogged and it would be a little while before the tack started flowing.  Mr. Sprinkle remained on top of his truck, as he normally did, waiting for the tack to flow.  What he did not know, because Hammaker employees failed to tell him, was that, when the clog loosened, it would come out with a big “kapow.”  He also did not know that, in addition to blowing air through, and heating the pipes, the Hammaker employees left on the valve that allowed tack to flow from their system into Mr. Sprinkle’s truck.  When the clog finally loosened, the pipe came bursting out of the truck, spraying tack all over the truck and Mr. Sprinkle and knocking Mr. Sprinkle more than 10 feet to the ground.

Mr. Sprinkle’s knee was “pulverized” according to his doctor.  He had a complicated surgery to reconstruct his knee, a long period of recovery, and will likely need knee replacement surgery in the future.  After knocking him off his truck, Hammaker employees left Mr. Sprinkle sitting outside in the below-freezing temperature, until his supervisor arrived and called 911.  There was testimony that Hammaker’s plant manager, Bryan Miller, was slurring his words and reeked of alcohol immediately after Mr. Sprinkle’s fall.

Attorneys Valerie Johnson and Narendra Ghosh and paralegal Elizabeth Weatherspoon provided valuable assistance throughout the trial.

Continue for details from the opinion:

In their third amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendant failed to compensate them for time spent engaged in donning and doffing protective equipment (including, for purposes of this motion, protective clothing) and related activities (collectively “donning and doffing activites”). The specific activities for which they allege they were not compensated include: (1) obtaining their required protective equipment from designated areas in the plant; (2) walking to and from the work station, processing line, or both; (3) donning and doffing protective items and hygiene-related equipment before their shift, during their shift, and after their scheduled shift ends; (4) waiting for a shift to begin or for relief to arrive; (5) washing and cleaning tools and other equipment; and (6) other pre- and post-shift activities required by defendant. Plaintiffs seek unpaid back wages, unpaid benefits, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and other relief.

The FLSA allows for the commencement of an action for unpaid minimum wages and overtime pay against an employer by “any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” … In order to determine if the proposed class is similarly situated at this stage of the proceeding, courts must consider: (1) the factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) whether defendant has presented individualized defenses; and (3) fairness and procedural issues presented.  “Variations in damages . . . do not warrant decertification.”

To be sure, trial of a collective action of this type and magnitude is no small undertaking. But other courts have managed similar litigation involving donning and doffing in the meat and poultry processing industry, and objections on this basis are accordingly unfounded. … For these reasons, a collective action would be a fair and efficient means of resolving plaintiffs’ claims, and this third and final factor therefore favors certification. Because he other two factors do as well, defendant’s motion to decertify the conditionally certified class should be denied.

Defendant Margaret Swan appeals from an order granting Plaintiff Rebecca Davis joint legal custody and secondary physical custody of Swan’s biological child (“minor child”). Swan argues that the trial court erred by applying the best interest standard to the child custody dispute between the parties. Because the record shows that Swan acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected right to exclusive care and control of the minor child, we affirm the trial court’s decision to apply the best interest of the child standard.

On appeal, Davis was represented by Burton Craige, Narendra Ghosh, and Sharon Thompson of the Sharon Thompson Law Group.

We became involved in the case in 2008.   We obtained documents from the Department of Motor Vehicles, the companies’ bank and their accountant to show how the companies and its owners moved money and assets around.  The jury found that Hersek fraudulently transferred five trucks to the new company; they also found that Diamond H and the owners of the two companies controlled Hersek to the extent that it had no separate corporate identity.  Danny is now entitled to collect his judgment from Diamond H and the individual owners as well as from Hersek.  Danny was represented by Ann Groninger and Paige Kurtz of Sprouse & Kurtz, PLLC.

The union challenged Corbett’s termination and the case was initially decided by an experienced labor arbitrator.  Corbett, a 34-year employee, did nothing wrong in getting fired, but was terminated without just cause because of Bridgestone’s unilateral decision.  This is commonly known as a persona non grata situation.  The arbitrator found that this firing violated the union’s contract with UNICCO, and award Corbett 68 weeks of pay as damages because she could not order Bridgestone to return him to work.  UNICCO challenged the arbitrator’s decision in federal court.

In his July 16, 2010 opinion, Judge Boyle affirmed the arbitrator’s award and granted the union’s motion to enforce it.  Judge Boyle reasoned: 

The CBA does not specifically provide for the persona non grata situation in the instant case. Rather, the CBA provides that employees may be terminated for just cause or laid off subject to seniority. Plaintiff admits that Corbett was not fired for cause, and the arbitrator determined that Corbett was not laid off because Corbett’s work was available and reinstatement based on seniority was not an option. Therefore, the arbitrator properly concluded that Corbett was terminated in violation of the CBA. The arbitrator’s recognition that Plaintiff acted in good faith and made every effort to find work for Corbett does not cure this breach. … Here, the arbitrator’s award is more properly viewed as damages for breach of contract rather than severance pay. And the CBA does not limit the remedy that the arbitrator may award for a breach of contract. As such, the arbitrator properly determined an award that drew its essence from the CBA. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Enforce is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate is DENIED.