Introduction:

“The provision for extending the two-year time limitation for medical treatment is not often discussed, but it can make a profound difference for claimants who need medical care in the future. This paper discusses the development of this provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1, as well as the substantive and procedural issues raised by the statute.”

 Introduction:  The 2010 Term of the Supreme Court of the United States put a spotlight on the significant – though oddly unheralded – role that employment law plays in our country’s economy and in our citizens’ daily lives. One of the nation’s keenest (and self-described “obsessive”) Court observers recently characterized this term as “straight-up dull.” Emily Bazelon, “Chamber of Pain,” The New York Times Magazine, p. 9 (August 7, 2011.) My own judgment, however, is that what the Justices did in the employment area was consequential, if not downright exciting.  Through a number of employment-related cases, a cohesive and assertive majority of the Court fashioned the law to fit its socio-economic (if not overtly political) view that the employment relationship ought to be deregulated.  In doing so, the Court continued to pursue what the Reagan revolution began and the Tea Party followers hope to complete.  But more about that later.  For Court observers of all political stripes, the 2010 Term’s smorgasbord of decisions provides a feast to be savored and debated for months to come.

This is a summary of the Union’s argument:  Because national labor policy strongly favors arbitration as the means for resolving labor disputes, courts must apply a presumption of arbitrability to collective bargaining agreements that contain arbitration provisions, and direct the parties to arbitrate unless the parties have expressly agreed not to arbitrate a particular matter.  Any doubt or ambiguity regarding arbitrability is to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 

Here, the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and separate settlement agreement for grievant Brian Pollard require arbitration of the grievance regarding Pollard’s termination because Pollard was not a “new employee” when he was rehired in 2010.  Moreover, to the extent the settlement agreement is ambiguous about permitting Pollard’s grievance to be arbitrated, that ambiguity must be construed in favor of arbitration.  Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied, and plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration – filed this same day – should be granted.

Introduction:

On July 25, 2011, the North Carolina House of Representatives, by a vote of 74-42, overrode Governor Perdue’s veto of the medical malpractice bill (SB 33). The enactment of SB 33 culminated an intense six-month legislative battle.

When the Act becomes effective on October 1, 2011, a new era of malpractice litigation in North Carolina will begin. Injured patients, who already face formidable barriers, will find it harder to find a lawyer, pursue their claims, and recover adequate compensatory damages. Lawyers and judges will be forced to decipher complex new statutory language.  Courts will confront constitutional challenges to the bill’s most controversial provision, the $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages.

Introduction:

In June 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted HB 542, titled “Tort Reform for Citizens and Businesses.”  Section 1.1 of HB 542 creates a new rule of evidence (Rule 414) that limits evidence of past medical expenses to “the amounts actually paid to satisfy the bills” and “the amounts actually necessary to satisfy the bills that have been incurred but not yet satisfied.”  Section 1.2 amends G.S. § 8-58.1, limiting the plaintiff’s testimony about reasonable medical expenses to the amount “paid or required to be paid in full satisfaction” of the charges. In combination, the new provisions, commonly referred to as “billed v. paid,” will significantly reduce the amount that injured plaintiffs can recover for their medical expenses.  The billed v. paid provisions are effective for all actions “arising on or after” October 1, 2011.

In the past decade, many states have confronted the billed v. paid issue in their appellate courts.  A handful of states have addressed the issue legislatively.  This paper reviews the experience in other jurisdictions, traces the evolution of billed v. paid in North Carolina, and identifies a potential constitutional challenge to the new legislation.

Here is a summary of the Union’s position: 

First, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for failure to timely effect service because plaintiff did not properly serve defendant before the 120-day deadline elapsed, and had no good cause for its failure to do so.  Second, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because plaintiff CFPTA was not a party to the arbitration decision that it seeks to vacate, has no standing to challenge the decision, and has provided no relevant authority to demonstrate that it is permitted to bring this suit under 28 U.S.C. § 185. 

Third, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for failure to state a valid claim to vacate the arbitration decision.  The arbitrator correctly determined that Professional Transit Management of Wilmington, Inc. (“PTM”) violated the controlling collective bargain agreement (“CBA”) in terminating the grievant, and to the extent there was ambiguity in the operative language of the CBA, the arbitrator’s interpretation cannot be disturbed by the Court.  Under the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court, plaintiff has also failed to show how the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate the grievant violates any clearly established public policy.  For all these reasons, the Court should award defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this litigation because plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award has no arguable basis in the law.

Summary of the Brief:  “Decades ago, North Carolina joined nearly every other state in recognizing that survivors of prenatal medical malpractice can bring negligence claims against the doctors responsible for their injuries and birth defects. … Our courts did not make recovery dependent on a fetus’s gestational age at the time of the negligence.

The question of whether North Carolina’s Wrongful Death Act, N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-2 creates a cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus has no relation to claims of common law negligence.  When it is reasonably foreseeable that negligent care could injure a woman’s future child, doctors have the duty to avoid negligently placing the future child at risk of injury.  This duty does not depend on whether a fetus has reached the stage of viability.  Accepting a contrary rule would run counter to North Carolina law, break ranks with every other state, and deny a remedy to injured children who will suffer their entire lives because of avoidable medical negligence.”

In April 1993, Mr. Taylor was wrongfully convicted and sentenced to life in prison for a murder two years earlier which he did not commit.  The Defendants worked in the SBI Crime Lab and wrote a deliberately misleading report about evidence collected from the crime scene.  Because this report misrepresented the facts and the findings of the laboratory tests, Mr. Taylor was convicted of a crime he did not commit and spent the next 17 years in prison.  On February 17, 2011 a three-judge panel unanimously found that Mr. Taylor was innocent of the charge of murder and ordered his immediate release.  Mr. Taylor was given a full Pardon of Innocence by Governor Beverly Perdue on May 21, 2010.

Mr. Taylor’s complaint brings claims under the federal constitution, North Carolina Constitution, and North Carolina common law.  Mr. Taylor is represented by Burton Craige and Narendra Ghosh, as well as Spencer Parris and Christopher Olson at Martin & Jones.