This is a summary of the Union’s argument:  Because national labor policy strongly favors arbitration as the means for resolving labor disputes, courts must apply a presumption of arbitrability to collective bargaining agreements that contain arbitration provisions, and direct the parties to arbitrate unless the parties have expressly agreed not to arbitrate a particular matter.  Any doubt or ambiguity regarding arbitrability is to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 

Here, the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and separate settlement agreement for grievant Brian Pollard require arbitration of the grievance regarding Pollard’s termination because Pollard was not a “new employee” when he was rehired in 2010.  Moreover, to the extent the settlement agreement is ambiguous about permitting Pollard’s grievance to be arbitrated, that ambiguity must be construed in favor of arbitration.  Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied, and plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration – filed this same day – should be granted.

Here is a summary of the Union’s position: 

First, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for failure to timely effect service because plaintiff did not properly serve defendant before the 120-day deadline elapsed, and had no good cause for its failure to do so.  Second, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because plaintiff CFPTA was not a party to the arbitration decision that it seeks to vacate, has no standing to challenge the decision, and has provided no relevant authority to demonstrate that it is permitted to bring this suit under 28 U.S.C. § 185. 

Third, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for failure to state a valid claim to vacate the arbitration decision.  The arbitrator correctly determined that Professional Transit Management of Wilmington, Inc. (“PTM”) violated the controlling collective bargain agreement (“CBA”) in terminating the grievant, and to the extent there was ambiguity in the operative language of the CBA, the arbitrator’s interpretation cannot be disturbed by the Court.  Under the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court, plaintiff has also failed to show how the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate the grievant violates any clearly established public policy.  For all these reasons, the Court should award defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this litigation because plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award has no arguable basis in the law.

Because the language of USERRA is very similar to Title VII, this principal likely also applies to cases of race and sex discrimination at least.  (More coverage here, here.)

Judge Whitney did not issue a written decision, but plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to summary judgment well describes this case:

This case raises a very poignant and present question, which is the extent of an employer’s liability under state and federal law for the conduct of a seemingly mentally unstable supervisor who tormented his female employees with threats of violence, including gun violence, surveillance of their homes, and numerous bizarre sexual comments. Regrettably, the conduct at issue in this case is a cautionary tale of an employer that flubbed the handling of a potentially dangerous situation by initially ignoring glaring warning signs, subsequently severely under-reacting to them, and which ultimately chose to circle the wagons around the proverbial outlaw, rather than act as a responsible member of our corporate community. Thankfully, Spicer did not turn his guns on these women as he said he might, but plaintiffs feared that he was fully capable of physically harming them. They have carried emotional scars left by Mr. Spicer’s conduct; injuries made worse by their employer’s betrayal of them. Defendants may aim to use their summary judgment motions to establish a low water mark of the protections afforded women in the workplace in North Carolina; however, plaintiffs respectfully submit that they have marshaled sufficient facts to permit a jury to answer that question.